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Abstract
We consider the welfare impact of the mandatory and voluntary labelling to infor
consumers on GMOs content in foods. With a model of vertical di¤erentiation in
competitive markets, we evaluate the e¤ects on price equilibrium and welfare levels.
We …nd that the mandatory labelling scheme would be optimal in those countries with
more GMO-averse consumers and no-GMOs practices producers. Voluntary labelling
would instead optimally be chosen in those countries where producers are using GMOs
and consumers are more concerned about the costs savings resulting in this technology
adoption.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of public discussion and concern, both
at national and international level, about issues of food safety and the environmental impacts
of consumer goods. One example for all exemplify the amount of attention drawn among
consumers, …rms, and policy-makers alike by these concerns, and that is the controversy
on genetically manipulated products (GMOs). These are agricultural products in which
some forms of gene splicing has occurred. Indeed genetic engineering involves the transfer of
genetic information from one organism to the other to ensure traits such as insect or herbicide
resistance, to improve potential yields, and to enhance nutritional or other characteristics.
Opponents of these products are concerned about the possibility that some pest-resistant
traits may be spread to other less valuable plant varieties in the environment. Or that
the transfer of some allergens or carcinogens may pose unknown risks to human health
(Economist, 1999). Some are also worried that the use of marker genes to identify plants
resistance to ampicillin may lead to antibiotic resistance (Kinsey, 1999). In addition, there
are concerns about the consolidation in the control of GMOs by a small number of big
patent-owners and the possible implications for consumers and family-farms (Falck-Zepeda
et al., 1999).
An important aspect of the issue is that the products of concern are indistinguishable to
consumers. More often that not the nutritional content is indeed not signi…cantly di¤erent
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from traditional products, and the only di¤erence is in the technology adopted. Even when
nutritional contents is indeed di¤erent, consumers may be unable to discern it. In other
words, these products or production characteristics are unobservable to consumers and hence
are considered credence goods (Caswell & Mojduszka, 1996).
As a consequence, there has been a lot of discussion on the appropriate forms of reg-
ulation for the production and trade of these products, and in particular on the best way
to allow …rms and consumers to make informed choices. In some cases opponents are even
proposing a ban on these products, and the controversies span form national to international
markets. Indeed, some are concerned that these disputes, away from being of relevance
only to agricultural interests, may threat food security and disruptions of the global trading
system as a whole (Runge & Jackson, 2000).
One aspect that has caused particular controversy is whether labelling of potential GMO
products should be mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory labelling usually implies that all
producers of goods presumed to be ”unsound” or ”unsafe” (e.g., genetically manipulated
products) are requested to declare themselves as such through product labels. Some call
this option ”positive” labeling, since is informing consumers that a product contains GMOs
ingredients. On the other hand, under voluntary labelling schemes, …rms can voluntarily
label their products as ”sound” or ”safe” (e.g., not genetically manipulated). In both cases
the labelling system requires some degree of random monitoring by the government or some
labelling agency in order to be credible to consumers.
The choice of mandatory vs. voluntary labelling is hence subject to considerable contro-
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versy. In the case of genetically manipulated organisms, the United States has generally been
in favor of voluntary labelling and recently the FDA reiterated this position. The European
Union, on the other hand, together with other countries, has taken the stand for manda-
tory labelling. In addition, in general one may argue that consumers often favor mandatory
systems, while producers prefer voluntary systems.
Related to this controversy, several questions arise. Which system is preferable under
what conditions? What is the di¤erence in e¤ects of the two systems on the a¤ected parties,
including …rms and consumers? How do the bene…ts or costs from the two labelling systems
depend on the type of consumers (e.g., their degree of concern over product safety) and the
type of …rm (e.g., whether it prefers to use the ”unsafe” practice or not)? What is the e¤ect
of monitoring costs?
In this paper we present a simple model which contributes to answering these questions.
The model incorporates the prevailing information asymmetry between producers and con-
sumers and we show the di¤erences between a voluntary and a mandatory scheme. The
impacts of the alternative systems on consumers and producers of di¤erent types are dis-
cussed and used to explain the observed preferences for a particular system by di¤erent
groups or countries.
We then proceed to endogenize the choice of the two systems by letting it be chosen by a
social-welfare maximizing government. The results are used to derive the conditions under
which mandatory labeling is socially preferable over voluntary labeling and vice versa. We
show that (and how) the answers to the research questions posed above depend on consumer
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preferences, …rms’ cost structure, monitoring and labeling costs. Note that while the focus
here is on GMOs, the same considerations apply to other settings, including the concern over
mad cow disease in Europe, the impact of shrimp production on local mangrove ecosystems,
and many more.
In the next section we review the literature on the regulation of GMOs. We then proceed
to describe the model and then show the e¤ects of the regulation on di¤erent agents. We
end with the choice of the optimal system and conclude with some of the questions that are
still open and need to be investigated.
2 The regulation and related literature
The issues on GMOs are sometimes overlapping with those regarding food safety in general,
a topic that in the last years has gained prominence in the scienti…c community and policy
arena. The problems and their relative analysis can be summarized in those points which
concern producers, consumers, international trade and the optimal regulation.
Some studies have investigated the impact on economic welfare of the adoption of GMOs.
Producers do not appear to be the only bene…ciaries from their adoption, even though their
expected pro…ts increase because either plants become resistant to pests - being them insects,
weeds, diseases, etc. - and hence need less chemicals or other inputs, or because they increase
yields. Hence the main incentive for producers to adopt a GMOs technology would be related
to the possible increased pro…ts. But the costs savings or yields increases for producers would
also translate in an increase of e¢ciency in the system, i.e., a reduction in market prices,
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which would bene…t consumers alike.
Assuming a homogeneous set of commodities, these studies consider how the distribution
of bene…ts and costs vary among di¤erent agents - consumers, producers and GMO-patent
…rms - and di¤erent countries, according to the rate of technology adoption and protection of
intellectual property rights. As it is emerging, GMOs crops are cultivated mainly in the US,
Canada and Argentina, with the lion’s share for soybeans, corn and cotton. In a situation
with protected property rights, most of the bene…ts would go to the innovator, to consumers
and to producers (Moschini, 2001)
But these studies consider a simpli…ed setting, that is a world where there are no risks,
informational asymmetries, etc. But the reality is that consumers in many countries have
strongly manifested their opposition to GMOs products. The fact is that consumers are
worried by health risks, such as allergies to new proteins and antibiotic resistance. They
oppose GMOs on ethical principles, arguing against unnatural genetic manipulation. A
strong case is also made by those who fear unknown long-term health impacts (Hobbs &
Plunkett, 2000). In other words, consumers demand to be protected based on their right to
know and governments try to deliver on it.
Few would argue that markets are e¢cient in ensuring optimal resource allocation in the
case of GMOs products, as they are recognized as being an example of credence goods, goods
whose quality is di¢cult to ascertain by consumers both before and after consumption. As
such they would need some forms of intervention in order to correct market failures due to
information asymmetry.
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The relevant question is in fact which is the optimal regulation of GMOs products use
and trade. The positions and the solutions proposed are very di¤erent. For example, some
…rms are voluntarily certifying that their products are GMO-free. Some retailers are banning
all food items with any GMO-based ingredient and selecting suppliers accordingly. Many
countries are thinking about restricting or banning imports of GMOs commodities. The
European Union has already enforced a mandatory labeling regime, soon to be followed by
other major countries. Indeed, the dimension of the problem is now international, with the
GMOs products being seen as an example of the risks associated with globalization and the
controversy about their trade as an opportunity to oppose trade liberalization.
The main controversy is now regarding the use of labeling, and in particular whether
it should be mandatory or instead on a voluntary basis. One can easily summarize the
literature by noting that in the majority of studies emerge that voluntary labelling would be
better for economic welfare. The main argument is ”let the market decide” (Sheldon, 2000).
And this would be right both in a country-by-country case and for international trade.
The need to enforce labelling or minimum safety standards emerges when one consider
food safety problems in a situation of asymmetric information and credence goods. Using
a two-period model and a monopolistic market, Marette et al (2000) show that the optimal
regulation is represented by voluntary labelling together with third party monitoring. Crespi
& Marette (2000), studying how food safety should be …nanced in a single period model, …nd
the advantage of a voluntary labeling …nanced with a per-unit fee that maintains competition
among safe sellers. Indeed, a voluntary scheme would be su¢cient, i.e., better, when there
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is more than one seller, whilst a mandatory scheme would be needed with a monopolist.
A parallel but less formal strand of literature argues against mandatory labelling enforced
in the international arena. One reason, for example, is that the costs of mandatory labeling
would be higher because of the need to segregate, when the bene…ts of it would be similar to
those of voluntary labeling and only for part of consumers (Caswell, 1998). But costs would
come after what governments perceive as the rights of consumers to know, at least in those
countries where concerned consumers are numerous. For this reason one should expect in
the future to see both countries with mandatory and voluntary labeling (Caswell, 2000).
Arguing that voluntary (referred as negative, in the sense that it says that ”this product
contains no-GMOs”) labelling is to be preferred, Runge & Jackson (2000) recognize that the
information provision through labelling is a form of public good and governments ought to
share responsibility for its implementation. In addition, they argue for an harmonization
e¤ort by supranational bodies, e.g., FAO, to ensure a common system of labelling to be
enforced at the WTO level.
But while the economic analysis is relatively unanimous in arguing for the superiority of
the voluntary approach to labelling, the fact is that in the policy arena the issue is contro-
versial and only few countries, indeed those with the majority of GMOs planted acreage, are
in fact enforcing voluntary labelling. One has to consider indeed di¤erences in consumers
and producers interests in di¤erent countries to explain these di¤erent positions.
In this regard, Giannakas & Fulton (2001), in a paper that is relatively close to the one
we propose, takes explicitly into account the heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences and the
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di¤erent costs they may face with diverse policy options. In this fashion, they can rationalize
the requests for a ban on GMO-based commodities when these are perceived as di¤erent. In
addition, they can rank the no-labelling to the mandatory labelling policy according to the
degree of aversion to GMO-food, the segregation costs, the share of GMO markets and the
extent of mislabelling.
They do not consider though the choice of mandatory vs voluntary labelling. In this paper
we tackle exactly this question, taking explicitly into consideration di¤erences in consumers’
preferences, costs of di¤erent policy options, and the distribution of bene…ts and costs to
di¤erent interests in an international setting. Our purpose in indeed to show a model that
can explain the di¤erent positions in the policy arena and be the basis for some welfare
comparisons and policy evaluations.
3 The model
Suppose that a given agricultural commodity, e.g., soybeans, can be produced either with Ge-
netically Modi…ed Organisms (GMOs) or with a more traditional technology, i.e., GMO-free
seeds and agronomic practices. There are two types of …rms, with each type corresponding
to these two options and having di¤erent production costs. The GMO-based …rms have unit
costs of production equal to cu, whilst the GMO-free …rms have unit costs of production of
cs. 1 We assume that the use of GMOs allows producers to reduce their production costs,
i.e., cs >c u.
1 Here s stands for ”sound” or ”safe” to indicate also that this model is more general and applies to a whole
range of issues other than GMOs, such as environmental labelling, child labour-free clothing, etc.
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We also assume that within each group of …rms there is perfect competition, so that the
market price will be determined only by marginal costs. With these latter - as we will see
below - we include production costs as well as labelling costs and segregating costs. Although
under this assumption pro…ts are zero, …rms prefer higher to lower market shares.
There is a continuum of consumers, each of which buys one unit of the good. They
all value the basic utility from the good as a, and for simplicity we assume that a = cu.
However, consumers also value - to varying degrees - the fact that a product is GMO-free.
Let this valuation be given by µ and let µ be uniformly distributed across consumers within
the interval [0;µ].
Let Pi
s denote the price of sound, i.e., GMO-free, products, where i 2f m;vg and ”m”
denotes a mandatory labelling system, whilst ”v” a voluntary labelling regimen. Similarly,
Pi
u denotes the price of GMO-based products. Consumers’ utility, in monetary terms, from
buying a GMO-based product is thus Ui
u = a¡Pi
u, and that from buying a GMO-free product
is Ui
s = a + µ ¡ P i
s.
Thus, for given prices, consumers buy GMO-free products if Ui




u and they buy GMO-based products otherwise. Hence, we have that consumers with
µ ¸ Pi
s ¡Pi
u buy the GMO-free good and those with µ<P i
s ¡P i
u buy the GMO-based good.
Note however that in the absence of a credible labelling system, the two types of products
are indistinguishable to consumers.
9A simple model of voluntary vs mandatory labelling of GMOs
4 Creating a labelling system
4.1 Voluntary labelling
With voluntary labelling, GMO-free …rms can distinguish themselves from GMO-based …rms
through labelling. However, the labelling has to be credible to consumers. Therefore, the
GMO-free …rms have to build up or support a third-party labelling Agency which monitors
those …rms which use the ”GMO-free” label. In this simple model, it is assumed that the
system is structured in such a way that monitoring and …nes ensure perfect compliance.
We assume that the labelling, i.e., monitoring costs, are borne by the …rms which use
the label. The amount is C per unit of labeled product, that is we use the optimal …nancing
method (Crespi & Marette, 2000). The new prices in the resulting market equilibrium are
then the following: Pv
u = cu and P v
s = cs + C.
With voluntary labelling, consumers with µ ¸ b µ,w h e r eb µ = Pv
s ¡ P v
u = cs ¡ cu + C buy
the GMO-free product. Their utility is Uv
s = a + µ ¡ cs ¡ C. On the other hand, consumers
with µ<b µ buy the unlabeled or GMO-based product receiving an utility of Uv
u = a ¡ cu.
4.2 Mandatory labelling
In the case of mandatory labelling, the government requires all GMO-based products to
be labelled as such. To make the system credible, the government has to set up a system
composed of monitoring and …nes to assure compliance. Assume that the total cost of this
system is the same as under the voluntary system, but that now this cost is paid by the
government, which raises the funds by levying a tax on all consumers for an amount t.O r ,
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equivalently, the costs are paid from existing tax revenues which are then not available for
…nancing of other public goods. And given that the monitoring costs are now distributed
among all consumers, we have that t<C .
The prices resulting in the market equilibrium with mandatory labelling are now the
following: Pm
u = cu and P m
s = cs. In this case, consumers with µ ¸ e µ,w h e r ee µ = Pm
s ¡P m
u =
cs ¡ cu buy the GMO-free (unlabeled) product and their utility is Um
s = a + µ ¡ cs ¡ t.O n
the other hand, with mandatory labelling, consumers with µ<e µ buy the products labeled
as ”GMO-based”, with an utility of Um
u = a ¡ cu ¡ t.
5 Welfare e¤ects of the labelling system
As introduced above, the purpose of the paper is not to give an exact measure of the welfare
e¤ects of the di¤erent labelling systems but rather to formally show how and why we believe
these systems have a di¤erent impact of di¤erent groups of …rms and consumers, so to
explain the di¤erent positions on which system to enforce in the policy arena. We then
o¤er a preliminary analysis of the welfare e¤ects of the two systems on the di¤erent agents
involved.
5.1 GMO-free …rms
Under a mandatory system, the sound or GMO-free …rms attain a higher market share than
under a voluntary system, since e µ<b µ. Thus they prefer the mandatory system, also because
it does not make them to pay all the costs from distinguishing themselves from the GMO-
based …rms which they incur when having to set up a third-party labelling system under a
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voluntary system. Note that these …rms are more common in Europe than in the US.
5.2 GMO-based …rms
With the same reasoning, one can show that GMO-based …rms have higher market shares
under a voluntary system. This is because such a system imposes all monitoring costs on
GMO-free …rms, making their products more costly (beyond the price di¤erence caused
already by the higher production costs).
These higher costs induce some consumers to buy GMO-based products, those same
consumers that under a mandatory system would prefer GMO-free products. Note also that
these …rms are more common in the US.
5.3 ”Green” consumers
We may recognize that there are some consumers that would buy GMO-free products under
both systems, those who in our model would have µ ¸ b µ. These consumers prefer the
mandatory system because the utility under such a system, Um
s = a + µ ¡ cs ¡ t,i ss t r i c t l y
greater than that under the voluntary system, Uv
s = a+µ¡cs¡C,s i n c eC>t . The intuition
is that a voluntary system passes all monitoring costs onto consumers of GMO-free products,
while a mandatory system spreads the costs equally across all consumers, and potentially to
other taxpayers which do not even consume the product at all.
The position of these consumers can be best summarized with the following argument:
”GMO-based …rms are already saving on production costs and they should not receive an
additional advantage by making it harder for the good guys”. These consumers are more
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easily found in Europe, where a more pessimistic view of technology progress is quite common
in intellectual circles and media.
5.4 GMO consumers
One has also to recognize that a proportion of consumers do not value ”Gmo-freeness” per
se enough to induce them to buy GMO-free products under either system, and these are the
consumers with a preference parameter µ<e µ. These consumers prefer the voluntary system,
since a ¡ cu >a¡ cu ¡ t.
They indeed pay the same price for the good under both systems, but under the voluntary
system they do not have to bear the costs of the monitoring e¤orts. Their position will be
like ”If the green consumers think that GMO-freeness is so important to them, then they
should pay for the cost of distinguishing these products. We do not care about whether they
are one way or the other, so we should not pay for the distinction”. These types are more
common or more heard in the US.
5.5 ”Borderline” consumers
For a good part of consumers, those with a preference parameter such that e µ · µ<b µ,
purchasing decisions are very sensitive to prices. Indeed, they do not buy products labeled
as GMO-based under a mandatory system, but given the higher price of GMO-free products
under a voluntary system, they would opt for GMO-based products.
These consumers prefer the mandatory system if and only if their utility under that
system is higher than that under the voluntary system. That is to say, only if Uv
u = a¡cu <
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a + µ ¡ cs ¡ t = Um
s , which implies that µ ¸ t +( cs ¡ cu) ´ µ
¤. We know that they satisfy
e µ · µ<b µ and this implies that cs ¡ cu · µ<c s ¡ cu + C:
Since t<C , the critical value µ
¤ will lie within this interval. Thus, we can split them
up into two groups. Those with e µ · µ<µ
¤ prefer the voluntary system, while those with
µ
¤ · µ<b µ prefer the mandatory system.
6 Concluding remarks
The controversy over which labelling system, either voluntary or mandatory, is to be preferred
is igniting debates in the policy arena. Indeed, while economic analysis seems to prefer the
former, in reality many countries, e.g., Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan actually have
chosen the mandatory one.
In this paper we explicitly model the choice between the two systems, taking into account
di¤erences in consumers’ preference and implementation costs. We …nd that the superiority
of one system over the other depends on the relative importance of di¤erent groups of pro-
ducers and consumers. We indeed …nd that mandatory labelling may result welfare superior
in those countries where highly GMO-averse consumers are prevalent and producers are us-
ing mainly a no-GMOs technology. On the other hand, when consumers are not strongly
averse and prefer the price reduction associated with GMOs and producers mainly adopted
GMOs technologies, a country optimally prefers to enforce a voluntary labelling system.
The model presented in this paper is very simple, yet it captures some of the main
aspects of the problem and explains what one actually observes in reality. One could extend
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the analysis to consider di¤erences in total monitoring costs under the two systems, which
would likely reinforce the results presented here. In addition, to be more realistic, one should
consider the endogeneity of the type for the …rms. We assume that producers’ type is given,
when producers can in fact decide whether to adopt GMOs technology or not. One could
also consider imperfect monitoring and see whether it can e¤ect market equilibrium.
Even with the above mentioned and other extensions, we believe that this simple model
is only a …rst attempt to answer these topical policy questions. Important matters remain
untouched. For example, many believe there is a need for harmonization of a world trading
system in which di¤erent systems coexist. Others think that mandatory labeling could be
detrimental to GMOs market development, while a voluntary approach would be less ”puni-
tive” and would help emerging the preferences of all consumers, concerned and unconcerned.
We believe that these are important issues that deserve more research and modelling e¤orts.
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